A view of Captain Carlos Rodolfo Muñoz Piloña, center, as he walks down a hallway in the Guatemalan National Palace on March 23, 1982, after the military coup d'etat that installed General Ríos Montt into power. Captain Muñoz was the mastermind behind the military coup.
View of a cache of weapons and propaganda materials recently seized by the military from a Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP, safe house at the regional military garrison in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, February 1, 1982. The EGP emerged in 1967 from dissident factions of the guerrilla organization Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, Rebel Armed Forces, FAR, Catholic followers of liberation theology, and students affiliated with the Juventud Patriótica del Trabajo, JPT, a youth wing of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, Guatemalan Labor Party, PGT. The EGP established themselves in the highlands where civilian support for their cause was high. Among their demands were land reform, access to healthcare, and a respect for human rights, particularly for the Maya population of the country.
View of a cache of weapons and propaganda materials recently seized by the military from a Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP, safe house with General Benedicto Lucas García, far right, at the regional military garrison in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, February 1, 1982. The EGP emerged in 1967 from dissident factions of the guerrilla organization Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, Rebel Armed Forces, FAR, Catholic followers of liberation theology, and students affiliated with the Juventud Patriótica del Trabajo, JPT, a youth wing of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, Guatemalan Labor Party, PGT. The EGP established themselves in the highlands where civilian support for their cause was high. Among their demands were land reform, access to healthcare, and a respect for human rights, particularly for the Maya population of the country.
Colonel Byron Lima Estrada, center, shows a group of international journalists a cache of weapons recently found by the military in a Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP, safe house at the regional military garrison in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, February 1, 1982. Col. Lima Estrada was commander of the Quiché department army garrison. He received U.S. Army counterintelligence training at Fort Benning, Georgia, the School of the Americas, and instruction from the U.S. Army Mobile Training Team (MTT) and the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP). Following his term as intelligence chief, Lima Estrada served as senior officer in key operational units during the Guatemalan Armed Forces' "scorched earth" campaigns in the 1980s. Lima Estrada was convicted in 2001 for the 1998 murder of Catholic Bishop Juan José Gerardi Conedera, which is considered one of the most infamous crimes of Guatemala's post-war history.
A group of international journalists are shown a cache of weapons recently found by the military in a Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP, safe house with General Benedicto Lucas García, far right, at the regional military garrison in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, February 1, 1982. Colonel Byron Lima Estrada, the Santa Cruz del Quiché garrison commander, center, observes the guerrilla equipment. In 1981 the military regime and the Guatemalan army initiated a brutal counterinsurgency program of scorched earth tactics to consolidate control over civilians and counteract the influence of the guerrilla insurgency. The genocidal policies enacted by President Fernando Romeo Lucas García and later by Efraín Ríos Montt were also intended to eradicate the culture and identity of the indigenous population. For his role as army general in the internal armed conflict, General Benedicto Lucas García was sentenced on May 23, 2018 to 58 years in prison for crimes against humanity, aggravated sexual violence, and enforced disappearance. Col. Lima Estrada was convicted in 2001 for the 1998 murder of Catholic Bishop Juan José Gerardi Conedera, which is considered one of the most infamous crimes of Guatemala's post-war history.
A Guatemalan army soldier looks over a cache of weapons recently found by the military in a Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP, safe house at the regional military garrison in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, February 1, 1982. The EGP emerged in 1967 from dissident factions of the guerrilla organization Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, Rebel Armed Forces, FAR, Catholic followers of liberation theology, and students affiliated with the Juventud Patriótica del Trabajo, JPT, a youth wing of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, Guatemalan Labor Party, PGT. The EGP established themselves in the highlands where civilian support for their cause was high. Among their demands were land reform, access to healthcare, and a respect for human rights, particularly for the Maya population of the country.
An extended Maya family stands for a photograph in the rural highlands of Quiché, Guatemala, May 1, 1984. In the 36-year domestic armed conflict lasting from 1960 to 1996, an estimated 200,000 people were killed, up to 45,000 civilians were forcibly disappeared, and between 500,000 and 1.5 million people were internally displaced or fled the country. 83 percent of the victims were indigenous Maya people.
General Benedicto Lucas García, center, receives a map reading from his base commander Colonel Byron Lima Estrada, right, at the regional military base in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, January 20, 1982. In 1981 the military regime and the Guatemalan army initiated a brutal counterinsurgency program of scorched earth tactics to consolidate control over civilians and counteract the influence of the guerrilla insurgency. The genocidal policies enacted by President Fernando Romeo Lucas García and later by Efraín Ríos Montt were also intended to eradicate the culture and identity of the indigenous population. For his role as army general in the internal armed conflict, General Benedicto Lucas García was sentenced on May 23, 2018 to 58 years in prison for crimes against humanity, aggravated sexual violence, and enforced disappearance. Col. Lima Estrada was convicted in 2001 for the 1998 murder of Catholic Bishop Juan José Gerardi Conedera, which is considered one of the most infamous crimes of Guatemala's post-war history.
General Benedicto Lucas García, left, prepares to board a Bell helicopter with Colonel Byron Lima Estrada, right, on the tarmac of the military base in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, January 21, 1982. During the flight, General Benedicto Lucas García ordered his two door gunners to shoot at local campesinos on the ground below. Lucas García claimed that since the civilians ran from the approaching military helicopter, they must be guilty of being guerrillas. He later denied that he ordered the gunners to fire. In 1981 the military regime and the Guatemalan army initiated a brutal counterinsurgency program of scorched earth tactics to consolidate control over civilians and counteract the influence of the guerrilla insurgency. The genocidal policies enacted by Lucas García and later by Ríos Montt were also intended to eradicate the culture and identity of the indigenous population.
General Benedicto Lucas García speaks on a military radio at the regional army base in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, January 20, 1982. President Romeo Lucas García appointed his brother Benedicto Lucas García as chief of the General Staff of the Guatemalan Army in August of 1981 in response to the growing threat of insurgency to the military regime. Benedicto Lucas García was trained in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency at the controversial School of the Americas, SOA, and executed the military's scorched earth campaigns against the civilian Maya population. He was sentenced along with four other Guatemalan ex-officials on May 23, 2018 to 58 years in prison for crimes against humanity and aggravated sexual assault against Emma Guadalupe Molina Theissen and for the forced disappearance of her 14 year-old brother, Marco Antonio Molina Theissen, in 1981. Lucas García is currently on trial in Guatemala in a separate case of genocide, crimes against humanity, and forced disappearance of the Maya Ixil population during the period he was chief of the General Staff of the Guatemalan Army from 1981 to 1982.
Guatemalan Chief of Army staff General Benedicto Lucas García, center, speaks with Washington Post reporter Christopher Dickey, right, and Colonel Byron Lima Estrada, left, at the regional military garrison in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, January 20, 1982. Colonel Lima Estrada was commander of the Quiché department army garrison.
General Benedicto Lucas García speaks to a group of international journalists regarding a cache of weapons recently found by the military in a Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP, safe house, Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, February 1, 1982. President Romeo Lucas García appointed his brother Benedicto Lucas García as chief of the General Staff of the Guatemalan Army in August of 1981 in response to the growing threat of insurgency to the military regime. Benedicto Lucas García was trained in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency at the controversial School of the Americas, SOA, and executed the military's scorched earth campaigns against the civilian Maya population. He was sentenced along with four other Guatemalan ex-officials on May 23, 2018 to 58 years in prison for crimes against humanity and aggravated sexual assault against Emma Guadalupe Molina Theissen and for the forced disappearance of her 14 year-old brother, Marco Antonio Molina Theissen, in 1981. Lucas García is currently on trial in Guatemala in a separate case of genocide, crimes against humanity, and forced disappearance of the Maya Ixil population during the period he was chief of the General Staff of the Guatemalan Army from 1981 to 1982.
General Benedicto Lucas García points out possible locations of guerrilla presence on a map to international journalists at the regional military base in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, January 19, 1982. Guerrilla organizations listed on the map include the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP, and the Organización Revolucionario del Pueblo en Armas, Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms, ORPA. In the 36-year domestic armed conflict lasting from 1960 to 1996, an estimated 200,000 people were killed, up to 45,000 civilians were forcibly disappeared, and between 500,000 and 1.5 million people were internally displaced or fled the country. Guatemala's Historical Clarification Commission determined 93 percent of the violence was committed by government forces.
Guatemalan Army chief of staff General Benedicto Lucas García stands in front of the regional military garrison in Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala, January 1, 1982. President Romeo Lucas García appointed his brother Benedicto Lucas García as chief of the General Staff of the Guatemalan Army in August of 1981 in response to the growing threat of insurgency to the military regime. Benedicto Lucas García was trained in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency at the controversial School of the Americas, SOA, and executed the military's scorched earth campaigns against the civilian Maya population. He was sentenced along with four other Guatemalan ex-officials on May 23, 2018 to 58 years in prison for crimes against humanity and aggravated sexual assault against Emma Guadalupe Molina Theissen and for the forced disappearance of her 14 year-old brother, Marco Antonio Molina Theissen, in 1981. Lucas García is currently on trial in Guatemala in a separate case of genocide, crimes against humanity, and forced disappearance of the Maya Ixil population while he was chief of the General Staff of the Guatemalan Army from 1981 to 1982.
Local residents listen to a Guatemalan army officer, center, speak about forming civil defense patrols to secure their villages against leftist guerrilla attacks near Huehuetenango, Guatemala, September 1, 1982. The Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, civil defense patrols, PAC, were composed of members of rural communities particularly in the heavily indigenous northwest of the country and were directed with coercion and force by the Guatemalan Armed Forces. PACs effectively institutionalized military power at the local level by infiltrating and dissolving community loyalties and reorienting them to serve counterinsurgency efforts. The state regime was able to effectively recapture all guerrilla territory at an enormous cost in civilian deaths.
Local residents listen to a Guatemalan army officer, center, speak about forming civil defense patrols to secure their villages against leftist guerrilla attacks near Huehuetenango, Guatemala, September 1, 1982. The Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, civil defense patrols, PAC, were composed of members of rural communities particularly in the heavily indigenous northwest of the country and were directed with coercion and force by the Guatemalan Armed Forces. PACs effectively institutionalized military power at the local level by infiltrating and dissolving community loyalties and reorienting them to serve counterinsurgency efforts. The state regime was able to effectively recapture all guerrilla territory at an enormous cost in civilian deaths.
Local residents listen to a Guatemalan army officer, left, speak about forming civil defense patrols to secure their villages against leftist guerrilla attacks near Huehuetenango, Guatemala, September 1, 1982. The Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, civil defense patrols, PAC, were composed of members of rural communities particularly in the heavily indigenous northwest of the country and were directed with coercion and force by the Guatemalan Armed Forces. PACs effectively institutionalized military power at the local level by infiltrating and dissolving community loyalties and reorienting them to serve counterinsurgency efforts. The state regime was able to effectively recapture all guerrilla territory at an enormous cost in civilian deaths.
Local residents listen to a Guatemalan army officer speak about forming civil defense patrols to secure their villages against leftist guerrilla attacks near Huehuetenango, Guatemala, September 1, 1982. The Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, civil defense patrols, PAC, were composed of members of rural communities particularly in the heavily indigenous northwest of the country and were directed with coercion and force by the Guatemalan Armed Forces. PACs effectively institutionalized military power at the local level by infiltrating and dissolving community loyalties and reorienting them to serve counterinsurgency efforts. The state regime was able to effectively recapture all guerrilla territory at an enormous cost in civilian deaths.
Local residents listen to a Guatemalan army officer speak about forming civil defense patrols to secure their villages against leftist guerrilla attacks near Huehuetenango, Guatemala, October 1, 1982. The Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, civil defense patrols, PAC, were composed of members of rural communities particularly in the heavily indigenous northwest of the country and were directed with coercion and force by the Guatemalan Armed Forces. PACs effectively institutionalized military power at the local level by infiltrating and dissolving community loyalties and reorienting them to serve counterinsurgency efforts. The state regime was able to effectively recapture all guerrilla territory at an enormous cost in civilian deaths.
Local residents listen to a Guatemalan army officer, right, speak about forming civil defense patrols to secure their villages against leftist guerrilla attacks near Huehuetenango, Guatemala, October 1, 1982. The Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, civil defense patrols, PAC, were composed of members of rural communities particularly in the heavily indigenous northwest of the country and were directed with coercion and force by the Guatemalan Armed Forces. PACs effectively institutionalized military power at the local level by infiltrating and dissolving community loyalties and reorienting them to serve counterinsurgency efforts. The state regime was able to effectively recapture all guerrilla territory at an enormous cost in civilian deaths.